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Exclusion  has long  been  employed  as  a common  disciplinary  measure  against  defectors,
both  at  work  and  in  social  life.  In this  paper,  we  study  the  effect  of excludability  – exclusion
of the  lowest  contributor  –  on  contributions  in  three  different  team  production  settings.  We
demonstrate  theoretically  and  experimentally  that  excludability  increases  contributions.
Excludability  is  particularly  effective  in  production  settings  where  the  average  or maxi-
mum effort  determines  team  production.  In  these  settings,  we  observe  almost  immediate
convergence  to full  contribution.  In  settings  where  the  minimum  effort  determines  team
production,  excludability  leads  to a large  increase  in  contributions  only  if the  value  of  the
excluded  individual’s  contribution  to the  public  good  is redistributed  among  the included
individuals.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. IntroductionThe social and economic success of organizations and societies depends on the cooperative interactions of motivated
ndividuals. In organizations, teams are often employed in traditional management functions because they can execute
asks better, learn faster, and change more easily than traditional structures. In societies, cooperation in groups can yield
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efﬁciency and ﬂexibility. However, teams and groups face the free rider problem: individual incentives are often at odds
with efﬁcient actions. Much research has focused on how to overcome or alleviate this problem.1
In this paper, we focus on a novel institution designed to alleviate the free rider problem: excludability.2 Excludability
combines two incentives that have been identiﬁed in the literature as being crucial for motivation on the job: competition and
exclusion. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) note that “one of the dominant characteristics of modern societies is the important
role played by competition; competition is the force providing work incentives. Rewards within a ﬁrm (. . .)  are at least
partially based on relative performance” (p. 21). Similarly, exclusion is a common disciplinary measure against defectors
both at work and in social life. For example, shirking workers are ﬁred (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984); uncooperative neighbors
are not invited to neighborhood parties and other social events; societal defectors are incarcerated or expelled (Hirshleifer
and Rasmusen, 1989); and countries that violate international conventions are boycotted.
A combination of competition and exclusion is utilized in many organizations as an implicit or explicit incentive mech-
anism. Jack Welch of GE famously ﬁred the bottom 10% of employees each year, thus implementing competition among
employees to stay in the top 90% and exclusion of the bottom 10%. An estimated 20% of US ﬁrms utilize some sort of
forced ranking, including Ford, Sun and Microsoft. Although common, this method has met  with much controversy, and
the evidence supporting its practice is somewhat mixed. The stack ranking mechanism employed by Microsoft is a noto-
rious example. By utilizing this incentive system, managers are requested to rank their employees in three categories and
distribute bonuses accordingly. Given that the proportion of workers in each category is ﬁxed, the system relies entirely on
the relative performance of employees rather than on absolute levels of productivity.
While the beneﬁts of competition as suggested in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) have been repeatedly documented (see
Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2011), the ﬂip side of competition in
organizations has received attention only more recently. Competition may  discourage teamwork and become detrimental
in very different ways. Charness et al. (2013) and Berger et al. (2013) observe the emergence of disreputable behavior in two
experiments in which participants sabotage others’ work to increase their chances of winning the competition. Bandiera
et al. (2013) ﬁnd strategic partner selection when rank incentives are introduced, as workers choose to be part of teams with
other workers of similar ability to avoid competition, leading to substantial drops in performance.
We design an experiment to examine exclusion of the lowest-contributor under three production functions: the standard
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) where individual contributions are averaged to create team production, the
weakest link mechanism (WLM)  where the lowest contribution determines the team production level, and the best-shot
mechanism (BSM) where the highest contribution determines the team output.3,4 Our experiment includes a baseline treat-
ment without and two treatments with excludability. In the treatments with excludability, if all players contribute the same
amount, then no one is excluded. In the ﬁrst excludability treatment, the excluded party’s value from the team production is
simply lost from the perspective of the team. This corresponds to a situation in which, for example, in a social setting of the
neighborhood, the value of the noncontributing neighbor from attending the party is not captured. In the second exclud-
ability treatment, the value of the excluded party’s consumption of the public good is redistributed among the included
members. For example, when a low-contributing employee is excluded from the bonus pool, the remaining members get
larger bonuses. In an organizational perspective, exclusion generates savings for the employer (as she keeps some team
beneﬁts or bonuses), while redistribution is neutral relative to the baseline condition in the sense that all of the team output
remains within the team, and incentives for those not excluded increase.
Excludability is an attractive incentive institution for at least two reasons. First, it involves lower informational require-
ments than does exclusion without competition and with externally ﬁxed threshold level. The mechanism designer does
not need to determine in advance the threshold below which contributors will be excluded (how low is too low?). In addi-
tion, it involves lower information requirements for implementation. Participants do not need to know exactly how much
each of their team members has contributed (a cardinal measure), only the ordering of contributions (an ordinal measure).
These lower informational requirements are most likely the reason that excludability has been observed in the ﬁeld. Second,
it taps into the forces of competition and allows these competitive forces to work in favor of increasing contributions. In
contrast, exclusion without competition has more of a contractual structure; everyone knows in advance how much they
1 Laffont (1987) is the classic reference reviewing theoretical proposals. Ledyard (1995) summarizes early ﬁndings of the experimental literature in his
well-known review. More recent surveys are offered in Keser (2002), Zelmer (2003), Kosfeld and Riedl (2004) and Chaudhuri (2011).
2 The term excludability is a reference to the public goods literature to which our study links. Public goods are characterized by non-excludability from
consumption and non-competition in consumption. Our institution excludability implies the possibility of immediate exclusion of the worst free rider from
the  consumption of the public good. If contributions are the same across contributors, however, no exclusion takes place. Our institution redistribution
that  we explain in detail below implies both a possibility of exclusion and also a competition in consumption.
3 Classic examples of the WLM  involve meetings that can begin only when all participants arrive or joint production tasks in which each member’s
contribution is critical to producing the output. A typical example of the BSM is the volunteer’s dilemma, where one individual’s contribution is sufﬁcient
to  create joint beneﬁt, such as one employee stopping the assembly line to prevent the ﬁrm from producing more defective goods. An extreme example
occurs  when soldiers in a trench at wartime face a live grenade, and one soldier jumps on the grenade and loses their own life but saves the lives of all of
their  comrades.
4 Hirshleifer (1983) and Hirshleifer and Harrison (1989) ﬁrst analyzed these production functions in a two-player setting. While many studies examined
the  weakest link game (Van Huyck et al., 1993; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Bornstein et al., 2002), the best-shot mechanism has previously only been
studied as a sequential game in a two-player setting (Hirshleifer and Harrison, 1989; Prasnikar and Roth, 1992; Duffy and Feltovich, 1999; Carpenter, 2002).
Thus,  we will over-sample this treatment in our experimental design.
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Table  1
Experimental design.
Condition
Baseline Excludability (EX) Redistribution (RE)
Production function
VCM (average) VCM (6) VCM-EX (6) VCM-RE (8)
WLM  (minimum) WLM  (6) WLM-EX (6) WLM-RE (12)
BSM  (maximum) BSM (12) BSM-EX (6) BSM-RE (6)
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cote: The number of four-subject teams is recorded in parentheses. Because no previous researchers have investigated the BSM as a simultaneous-move
ame,  we oversampled in this treatment, recruiting 12 independent teams of four participants, twice as many as the other baseline treatments, which had
een  studied extensively.
eed to contribute to be included, and many contributions at that minimum level are observed. A negative side of our mech-
nism though is that it might exclude a relatively high contributor, yielding a sizable loss if there is no redistribution and
ompromising the willingness to participate.
Our paper contributes to the experimental work studying the effects of exclusion (without competition) on contributions
o a public good. In some studies, exclusion is explicit in the sense that individuals who contribute below a certain known
hreshold are excluded (Swope, 2002; Kocher et al., 2005). In other studies, exclusion can occur because individuals are
oted out of the group (Masclet, 2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010) or because they are not part of
n endogenously formed team (Brosig et al., 2005; Ehrhart and Keser, 1999; Ahn et al., 2008; Cabrera et al., 2013) or both
Charness and Yang, 2010; Charness et al., 2011). These studies ﬁnd that the possibility of exclusion increases contributions
n a signiﬁcant way, decreasing free riding behavior and increasing efﬁciency, although the efﬁciency gains depend on the
articular institutional arrangements. Those who are voted out of the group are typically the lowest contributors. In general,
he level of cooperation when the possibility of endogenous group formation exists is higher by the awareness that free
iding behavior will result in exclusion.5
Our experiment also relates to a work studying how competition to avoid punishment increases contributions. In Falkinger
t al. (2000), Orrison et al. (2004) and Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005), participants compete to avoid exogenous sanctions
r to gain exogenous rewards.6 Recently, a number of papers have studied how targeting the lowest contributor to linear
ublic goods increases contributions, for example, the punishment mechanisms investigated by Xiao and Houser (2011)
nd Andreoni and Gee (2012). While the former keep punishment small enough to maintain the incentives to free ride, the
atter carefully manipulates sanctions so that the person would have rather been the second least contributor. Both papers
emonstrate that targeting the lowest contributor to a linear public good game is a way of achieving larger contributions.7
We  ﬁnd that excludability helps to mitigate the free riding problem in team production. It dramatically increases contrib-
tions and obtains sustained and very high efﬁciency levels in the linear public good (reaching almost 100%). Contributions
re also increased without full efﬁciency in the BSM (also reaching full contribution). However, excludability fails to promote
imilarly dramatic efﬁciency gains in the WLM  unless combined with redistribution.
The intuition is that excluding low contributors is enough in the VCM and the BSM because top contributors continue to
eneﬁt from a team output partially or fully generated by their own efforts. Excludability has a smaller impact on contrib-
tions in the WLM  because contributors are still paid by a team output determined by low contributors. This generates an
ntense and almost immediate contribution reduction by some top contributors and traps the whole team in a low-effort
quilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the details of the experimental design, and in
ection 3 we summarize the theoretical predictions. Section 4 reports the experimental results, Section 5 contains explains
nd Section 6 concludes.
. Experimental design and procedures
We  employ a three (production function)-by-three (exclusion conditions) experimental design, as depicted in Table 1.
quilibrium predictions and efﬁciency properties for each treatment of the design are described in the respective subsection
f Section 3. Our participants consisted of 272 economics undergraduate students. We  utilized a between-subject design:
ach participant faced only one production function and one excludability condition. Participants were assigned to teams of
ize four (N = 4), and played a ﬁnitely repeated (10-round) game with ﬁxed teams. We  included a surprise restart (Andreoni,
5 Riedl et al. (2012) is the only paper dealing with exclusion in a non-linear environment. Subjects can choose the members with whom they want to
nteract in a WLM.  Endogenous exclusion generates large efﬁciency gains because high performers exclude low performers from future interactions, who
nd  up learning to become high performers, too.
6 All of these studies ﬁnd a large initial boost to cooperation, which diminishes over time.
7 Other papers considering exclusion in different forms are Güth et al. (2007) and Levati et al. (2007). While the former ﬁnds that exclusion empowers
eadership and increases contributions, the latter does not observe a signiﬁcant effect. Fatas et al. (2010) ﬁnd that probabilistic exclusion generates large
ooperation gains, even when full efﬁciency is never observed.
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1998; Croson, 1996; Croson et al., 2005; Andreoni and Croson, 2008) followed by a second ten-round game. The number of
independent teams is noted in parentheses in each cell of Table 1.
The examined production functions involve three well-known games: the voluntary contribution mechanism (hereafter
VCM) where production is a linear function of the average of the contributions, the weakest link mechanism (hereafter WLM)
where production is a linear function of the minimum contribution, and the best-shot mechanism (hereafter BSM) where
production is a linear function of the maximum contribution.
In the baseline condition, all participants receive the same return from team production regardless of their contribution.
The individual payoff to player i takes the form
Baselinei (x) = (e − xi) + 2F(x) (1)
where  denotes payoff, x is the vector of individual contributions, (e − xi) is the level of resources kept by i for her individual
consumption and F(x) is the team production. The three production functions corresponding to the three games are as
follows: F(x) =
∑
i
xi
N for the VCM, F(x) = min  {x1, . . .,  xN} for the WLM  and F(x) = max  {x1, . . .,  xN} for the BSM.
In the two other conditions (excludability [EX] and redistribution [RE]), the participant who contributes the least is
excluded from enjoying the beneﬁts of the team production. In the EX treatments, this excluded contributor’s share of team
production is lost, while in the RE treatments, it is redistributed among the included contributors.
The payoff function to player i under the excludability condition [EX] is as follows:
EXi (x) =
{
(e − xi) if max{x1, . . .,  xN} > xi = min{x1, . . .,  xN}
Baseline
i
(x) otherwise
(2)
Each individual whose contribution is the lowest within the team (i.e., max  {x1, . . .,  xn} > xi = min  {x1, . . .,  xN}) is excluded
from the beneﬁts from the team production and enjoys only the beneﬁts of their own  consumption e − xi. All non-excluded
individuals receive the same payoff as in the baseline treatment. In the extremes, up to N − 1 individuals can be excluded
or, if all contribute the same amount, no one is excluded. It is important to note that in all symmetric proﬁles, no one is
excluded and therefore, every individual receives the same payoff as in the baseline treatment.
Finally, in the redistribution condition [RE], the payoff to player i is as follows
REi (x) =
{
(e − xi) if max{x1, . . .,  xN} > xi = min{x1, . . .,  xN}
Baseline
i
(x) + n
N − n2F(x) otherwise
(3)
where n denotes the number of excluded contributors. Note that excluded contributors receive the same payoff in the RE
condition as in the EX condition, but included contributors receive the payoffs as in the baseline condition plus an extra
payment, which can be interpreted as a transfer from the excluded to the included. The extra payment is the return from
the team production, which is not paid to the excluded contributors 2nF(x), and is divided among the (N − n) included
contributors. As in the EX condition, for symmetric contribution proﬁles, no individual is excluded and subjects receive the
same payoff as in the baseline.
Our study reports the results of computerized experiments conducted at LINEEX, the experimental laboratory at the
University of Valencia.8 By participating in the experiment, a participant earned an average of D16; experiments took less
than one hour to run. At the beginning of a session, written instructions were read aloud. Thereafter, participants went
through a test including four control questions.9 The instructions were re-read until everybody had answered all questions
correctly. After the experiment, subjects were debriefed in a questionnaire, and they were asked individually whether they
had understood the instructions. Given their replies and the procedure, we are conﬁdent that the tasks and the incentives
were understood.
Participants were assigned to one session and played in only one of the nine treatments. The experiments entailed ten
rounds of play (original game) with another ten-round surprise restart game in a partner’s setting. Upon arriving at the lab,
participants were randomly and anonymously arranged in teams of four in the ﬁrst round and remained together throughout
both the original and the restart game. Participants received a record of all individual contributions in increasing order after
each repetition; individual contributions were not identiﬁed with their contributor. Additionally, participants were informed
about their own earnings both in total and subdivided by the return from the endowment kept and the return from team
production. Only neutral language was used; for example, participants allocated Eurocents (rather than contributing them)
to a group project.
8 Fischbacher’s (2007) zTree was used for the computer program. Experiments were run in 2002 and 2005.
9 The translated instructions and tests are included in Appendix D.
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. Theory
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium predictions for the different team productions and conditions. All proofs are
ontained in Appendix A.
.1. Nash predictions
.1.1. VCM: the voluntary contribution mechanism
The baseline condition corresponds to the standard VCM; one of the most frequently studied social dilemma environments
n experimental economics. It is well known to have only one equilibrium contribution level that corresponds to free riding.
layers have a dominant strategy to free ride because every unit contributed toward team production yields half a unit
ayoff to each individual in the team (because N = 4 and therefore, 2N−1 = 0.50), while each unit contributed toward personal
onsumption yields one unit payoff to the contributor only. Collective free riding is similarly predicted for the ﬁnitely
epeated game because it is the unique Nash equilibrium. This result is socially inefﬁcient because any contribution to team
roduction returns twice as much to the team as a contribution to individual consumption; in fact, if players contributed all
f their resources to the team production, they would achieve the socially efﬁcient outcome.
When excludability is considered, the dominance of the free-riding equilibrium is eliminated. In fact, the game now has a
ultiplicity of equilibria because every symmetric proﬁle of contributions is a Nash equilibrium. This result hinges on the fact
hat no one is excluded if all contribute the same amount. In these symmetric proﬁles, there are incentives neither to increase
ne’s own contribution (we are dealing with a public good game) nor to decrease it (because the player is excluded). When
edistribution is included, incentives to decrease one’s own  contribution from any symmetric proﬁle remain unchanged,
ut incentives to increase improve because of the extra bonus of getting the team production of the excluded members. As
 result, the possibility of excluding all others players by unilaterally increasing one’s own contribution is so proﬁtable that
layers seek increasingly larger contributions until they reach the full contribution (it is a case of inverse price competition).
roposition 1 formalizes these intuitions.
roposition 1. For the VCM, excludability [EX] turns the game into a coordination game where all symmetric proﬁles are
ash equilibria. Under redistribution [RE], full contribution is the unique Nash equilibrium.
.1.2. WLM:  the weakest link mechanism
In the WLM,  the minimum individual contribution determines the team production; thus F(x) = min{x1, . . .,  xN}. This game
s a coordination game in which all symmetric proﬁles are Nash equilibria. To see it, note that in any symmetric proﬁle,
here are incentives neither to increase one’s own contribution (because the team output would remain unchanged), nor
o decrease it (because the opportunity cost is twice the return from individual consumption). These symmetric equilibria
re Pareto ranked from collective zero contribution to collective full contribution of the entire endowment, where the latter
epresents the pareto-efﬁcient and payoff-dominant equilibrium. Excludability has no effect on the equilibrium structure
f the game because deviating by contributing less will induce exclusion, which will reduce proﬁts, and deviating by con-
ributing more will reduce private consumption without increasing the return from the team production because the team
utput is determined by the minimum individual contribution. Under redistribution, the possibility of receiving the output
hare of the excluded members gives incentives to increase contributions (provided that the team output is positive), and
s a result, full contribution and no contribution are the only pure NE. These intuitions are collected in Proposition 2.
roposition 2. For the WLM,  all symmetric proﬁles are NE in the Excludability [EX] condition. Under Redistribution [RE],
ull contribution and zero contribution are the only pure Nash equilibria of the game.
.1.3. BSM: the best-shot mechanism
The team production function in the BSM is the maximum contribution F(x) = max  {x1, . . .,  xN} . The NE structure of the
ne-shot BSM involves four pure asymmetric Nash equilibria10 in which one subject contributes her entire endowment
nd the other three team-members contribute nothing. These pure-strategy equilibria are also efﬁcient while increased
ontributions by the other players would result in social inefﬁciencies. Excludability prevents any asymmetric proﬁle –
uch as the efﬁcient NE of the baseline – from being an equilibrium. The incentives to avoid exclusion are powerful. As a
onsequence, the unique Nash equilibrium in the BSM-EX is full contribution. This equilibrium is inefﬁcient, as there are
ultiple individuals contributing the maximum level toward team production, when only one such contribution is necessary
o reach the same output level.11 The addition of redistribution adds nothing, as exclusion on its own is enough to drive
ontributions to the largest levels. Proposition 3 formalizes these intuitions.
10 a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which each subject contributes their endowment to team production with a probability of 1 − p1/(N−1) = 0.2063,
here  p = 1/2 for our parameters (see Croson et al., 2005). Several other (less-efﬁcient) mixed strategy equilibria exist as well.
11 The social payoff in the BSM-EX would be greatest if one subject were to contribute their entire endowment (creating the maximum team payoff), one
ubject were to contribute nothing (and would thus be excluded) and the other two subjects were to contribute the smallest possible amount (and would
hus  avoid exclusion). Unfortunately, this efﬁcient allocation is not an equilibrium; the excluded subject has an incentive to increase her contribution to
nable her to be included. Thus, this game has properties of a rent-seeking game where individuals (inefﬁciently) contribute too much.
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Table  2
Theoretical predictions for contributions in percentage of endowment.
Treatment NE RDE QRE
VCM
Baseline 0 0 0
VCM-EX Any symmetric 100 100
VCM-RE 100 100 100
WLM
Baseline Any symmetric Any symmetric 0
WLM-EX Any symmetric 0 or 100 0
WLM-RE 0 or 100 0 or 100 0
BSM
Baseline Asymmetric (0, 0, 0, 100) or mixed strategy Mixed strategy Mixed strategy
BSM-EX 100 100 100
BSM-RE 100 100 100
Proposition 3. For the Best-Shot Mechanism, full contribution is the unique NE under both the excludability [EX] and the
redistribution [RE] condition.
3.2. Reﬁnements
Our previous analysis reveals that the Nash concept makes unique predictions in only four out of the nine treatments
(VCM, VCM-RE, BSM-EX and BSM-RE). This weakness is especially serious in the WLM,  where the NE offers no unique point
prediction in any of the three treatments, and in two  of them (WLM and WLM-EX) every contribution level is part of a NE
proﬁle.
In this subsection, we seek to reﬁne our predictions pursuing two  different avenues. The ﬁrst one applies the equilibrium
selection criteria proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988): payoff dominance and risk dominance. Payoff dominance selects
full contribution whenever full contribution is a NE. Risk dominance allows no reﬁnement of our prediction in the WLM  (see
Fatas et al., 2006 for details) because no NE risk-dominates the others (hence, it can be said that all symmetric proﬁles are
risk dominant). Risk dominance selects full contribution in the VCM-EX and the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in
the BSM. Finally, full contribution and zero contribution are risk-dominant equilibria (RDE) of the WLM-EX and WLM-RE.
The second approach we consider involves the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which
always converges to an NE when the noise parameter goes to 0, and therefore, it will offer unique predictions for all
treatments.12 It selects full contribution in VCM-EX but the inefﬁcient NE for any treatment in the WLM,  where the NE
multiplicity problem is more severe.13 Why  these contrasting predictions? QRE assumes that the choice probabilities are
proportional to expected payoffs thus incorporating the intuitive notion that it is more likely that a player will make “mis-
takes” in the direction of higher expected payoffs. Excludability makes more costly those mistakes associated with small
contributions in the VCM-EX (because they increase exclusion probability), favoring large contributions and resulting in QRE
selecting full contribution.
This is not the case for the WLM  because when compared to the VCM, a large contribution submitted to avoid exclusion
is not as proﬁtable (because the team output is not affected), and low contributions that avoid exclusion are less costly
because by deﬁnition, they do not affect the team output (the output is determined by the minimum contribution that has
been excluded). As a consequence, QRE picks zero contribution. The bonus for large contributions in the redistribution case
is not large enough (typically only one member is excluded and her team production share is to be divided among three
members) to overcome the attraction of low contributions, and QRE also picks zero contribution in WLM-RE.14 Table 2
collects all of the theoretical predictions for contributions.
We are primarily interested in the effectiveness of exclusion on contribution behavior, equilibrium behavior and efﬁciency
levels, rather than testing these theoretical predictions per se. Thus, we  will compare within a production function across
excludability conditions. However, for the theoretically minded reader, we  will also compare experimental outcomes with
these equilibrium predictions. Note that the RDE and QRE models predict that excludability will imply full contribution in
VCM and BSM. In WLM,  QRE predicts zero contribution whereas RDE predicts zero or full contribution.
12 Obviously, it will coincide with RDE and NE whenever there is a unique NE.
13 It picks the mixed strategy NE in the BSM baseline, as RDE does.
14 QRE has been successful in organizing experimental data when intermediate values of the noise parameter are considered. For these cases, the intuition
is  correct that exclusion and redistribution increase contributions. For example, for a noise parameter  = 10, the mean value of the QRE distribution, as a
fraction  of the total endowment, is 22%, 24% and 30% for WLM,  WLM-EX and WLM-RE, respectively. However, the QRE prediction will never be above 50%
of  the total endowment for any intermediate value of the noise parameter (in the limit as noise goes to inﬁnity, QRE converges to the uniform distribution
with an average contribution equal to the midpoint of the interval.).
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Table  3
Average contributions in percentage of endowment.
Treatment Round Game
1 10 11 20 Original Restart Overall
VCM
Baseline 40 18 40 10 32 29 31
VCM-EX 70 93 92 97 82 93 88
VCM-RE 84 99 96 100 94 98 97
WLM
Baseline 42 21 34 17 24 21 22
WLM-EX 62 30 51 34 42 45 44
WLM-RE 54 61 79 81 68 86 77
BSM
Baseline 62 29 42 25 40 30 35
BSM-EX 94 100 99 100 98 100 99
BSM-RE 81 100 93 100 93 95 94
Table 4
Average efﬁciency and team production.
Treatment Efﬁciency (payoff/max. payoff)a Team productionb
VCM
Baseline 65% 31%
VCM-EX 83% 88%
VCM-RE 99% 97%
WLM
Baseline 52% 13%
WLM-EX 52% 26%
WLM-RE 72% 61%
BSM
Baseline 81% 79%
BSM-EX 86% 100%
BSM-RE 75% 100%
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b Recall that team production coincides with the average contribution level only for VCM.
. Experimental results
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of contributions in the nine treatments over the different time horizons of the
xperiment. We  focus on the level of contributions and their comparison in the baseline, excludability and redistribution
reatments within production functions and also the efﬁciency and team production levels that result from these contribution
ecisions. Parallel tables describing outcomes for those variables can be found in the online supplement (Tables B3.1 and
3.2).
We begin by analyzing the impact of excludability on contributions under the three production functions. Our statisti-
al analyses utilize two-tailed Mann–Whitney nonparametric tests unless it is stated otherwise. In comparing ﬁrst round
ontributions, we conduct our statistical tests on the individual contributions; it is reasonable to think these are indepen-
ent, as no participant has seen the previous contributions of any other participant. All other tests are conducted on team
ontributions, as individual contributions no longer represent independent observations.
In addition to the contribution as a measure of team performance, we are also interested in two alternative (derived)
ependent measures, the efﬁciency of the outcome and the level of team production. Economists are generally concerned
ith the efﬁciency of institutions. We  will measure efﬁciency in our context as the team’s payoff relative to the maximum
ossible team payoff.15 This analysis will enable us to answer the question of how efﬁcient the various institutions are in
ractice and can aid in institutional design questions of interest to the social planner. The efﬁciency levels for each treatment
veraged over the entire game are recorded in Table 4 (the interested reader should see Table B3.1 in the online supplement
or more disaggregated descriptions and Table B1.2 for a time trend analysis of efﬁciency across the three mechanisms). We
tatistically compare these levels utilizing the groups as independent observations.Finally, while a social planner or institution-designer may  be interested in efﬁciency, from the perspective of a principal
r an organization, performance may  be measured by the team production generated rather than by efﬁciency. The second
15 In the VCM, efﬁciency is positively (and linearly) correlated with the contribution amounts. But in the other production functions, there is no linear
apping from contributions to efﬁciency. For example, unanimous full contribution in the BSM is inefﬁcient. Note, however, that full contribution by all
eam  members still achieves a rather high efﬁciency level of 84.21%.
20 R. Croson et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 114 (2015) 13–26Fig. 1. Average contributions in VCM in percentage of endowment across treatments.
column of Table 4 records for the nine treatments the average team production levels as a proportion of the maximum
possible production level. Further details can be found in Tables B1.3 and B3.2 and Fig. B3.3 in the online supplement.
4.1. VCM
Fig. 1 plots contributions in the three treatments: baseline, excludability and redistribution (graphs of each team’s con-
tribution are provided in the online supplement). Consistent with previous experimental results (see e.g. Croson, 2007;
Neugebauer et al., 2009), we ﬁnd contributions in the VCM starting at just below one half the endowment and decreasing
over the course of the game to approximately 10–20% by the last round. The decline is signiﬁcant in both the original and
the restart game (see Table B1.1 in the online supplement). Again replicating previous work, we observe a signiﬁcant restart
effect in the VCM (p = 0.0277, N = 6, Wilcoxon signed rank test). Contributions double between these rounds from 18% in
round 10–40% in round 11.
Excludability signiﬁcantly increases contribution levels for the VCM production function in every round, consistent with
the theoretical predictions, and generally increases the efﬁciency in terms of subjects’ payoff (p = 0.002 for the entire game).16
Overall, the proportion of the endowment contributed averages 31% in the VCM and 88% in the VCM-EX, implying that the
average contribution increases by 184% if one adds excludability. Excludability also eliminates the pattern of declining
contributions; instead, in the VCM-EX treatment, contributions increase from 70% in the ﬁrst round to 97% in round 20
(Table B.1.1. in the online supplement statistically examines these time-trends). Excludability also eliminates the restart
effect (p = 0.5688, N = 6, Wilcoxon signed rank test).17
The addition of redistribution has an additional effect. Contributions in the VCM-RE are signiﬁcantly larger than in the
baseline and marginally higher than the VCM-EX treatment (p = 0.059 for the entire game).18 In the VCM-RE treatment, we
observe a marginal restart effect (p = 0.0854; N = 8) and almost full contribution (overall 97%).
Result 1a. Excludability is an effective mechanism for increasing and sustaining contributions in the VCM (approximately
88% of the endowment overall). The addition of redistribution has an additional positive effect, increasing contributions to
almost full levels.
Efﬁciency increases from the baseline to the treatment with excludability (p = 0.026) and to the treatment with redistri-
bution (p = 0.001 versus excludability only, p = 0.001 versus baseline). Regarding team production, it signiﬁcantly increases
from the baseline to excludability (p = 0.002) and redistribution (p = 0.059 versus excludability and p = 0.001 versus baseline).Result 1b. Excludability increases efﬁciency and team production, and adding redistribution enhances the result.
16 p-Values for the seven columns in Table 3 are 0.000, 0.002, 0.002, 0.002, 0.004, 0.002 and 0.002, respectively.
17 Increased average contributions with excludability are caused by signiﬁcantly fewer free riders and more full contributors; see the last column of Tables
B2.1  and B2.2 in the Appendix. While 65% of all actions in VCM-EX involve full contributions (and 2% involve zero contributions), only 3% full contributions
(and  14% free riding) are observed in the VCM.
18 p-Values for two-tailed Mann–Whitney tests comparing VCM and VCM-RE are 0.000, 0.001, 0.001, 0.001, 0.001, 0.001, and 0.001 for the seven columns
of  Table 3, respectively. Similar comparisons between the VCM-EX and the VCM-RE treatments are 0.043, 0.852, 0.662, 0.345, 0.043, 0.491, and 0.059,
respectively.
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.2. WLM
Fig. 2 plots contributions in the different WLM  treatments (the online supplement provides graphs of each team’s con-
ribution). In the WLM  baseline, contributions start at approximately 40% of the endowment and decline until ending at
pproximately 20%. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings in minimum effort games (Goeree and Holt, 2005), where
or the treatments with high costs of effort, averaged contributions ended at approximately 20–30% of the endowment.19
xcludability has an impact in the ﬁrst round, although the difference between WLM  and WLM-EX treatments quickly dis-
ppears (p = 0.240 for the entire game).20 Both treatments exhibit signiﬁcantly decreasing contributions over time (see Table
.1.1) and apparent but not signiﬁcant restart effects (p = 0.1159 and p = 0.1400, N = 6, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
Redistribution has a signiﬁcant impact in the WLM.  Average contributions in the WLM-RE treatment do not exhibit any
ecreasing trend (see Table B1.1) and are signiﬁcantly larger than in the baseline WLM  (p = 0.000 for the entire game) and
arger (marginally signiﬁcantly though) than in the WLM-EX (p = 0.067 for the entire game) with levels at approximately
5% of the endowment. We  also ﬁnd a marginally signiﬁcant restart effect (p = 0.0844, N = 12, Wilcoxon signed rank test).21
esult 2a. While excludability has only small effects on behavior in the WLM,  redistribution raises the contribution levels
o 75% of the endowment. This latter result cannot be rationalized by any of the models considered.
A similar picture is obtained when we analyze the impact of exclusion on the two alternate measures of team production.
hereas there is no signiﬁcant difference between the baseline and the treatment with exclusion (p = 0.394 for efﬁciency and
 = 1.00 for team production), the addition of redistribution has a positive impact on efﬁciency (p = 0.032 versus excludability,
 = 0.001 versus baseline) and team production (p = 0.053 versus excludability, p = 0.001 versus baseline).
esult 2b. Excludability has no effect on alternative measures of team production, but the addition of redistribution
mproves matters signiﬁcantly.
.3. BSM
Fig. 3 displays contributions in the different BSM treatments (graphs of each team’s contribution are provided in the
nline supplement). In the BSM, excludability increases contributions signiﬁcantly for every round and over the entire game
p = 0.000 for the entire game).22 In the BSM-EX, overall contributions average 99% of the endowment, involving 96% full
ontributions. Compared to the overall average contribution in BSM of 35%, excludability increases contributions by 182%.
19 These contribution levels can be ﬁtted by the QRE when assuming an intermediate value of the noise parameter. For  = 10, the QRE prediction in the
aseline WLM  is 22%. Note, however, that we rarely observe symmetric proﬁles at intermediate contribution levels. Thus, no equilibrium prediction is
ctually corroborated by the data.
20 p-Values for the seven columns of Table 3 are 0.008, 0.818, 0.485, 0.937, 0.240, 0.589 and 0.240, respectively. Nevertheless, one should note that
ompared to the WCM,  average contributions double in the WCM-EX.
21 p-Values for two-tailed Mann–Whitney tests comparing WLM  and WLM-RE are 0.009, 0.032, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000 and 0.000 for the seven columns
f  Table 3, respectively. Similar comparisons between the WLM-EX and the WLM-RE treatments are signiﬁcant in some cases, being 0.123, 0.250, 0.067,
.032,  0.083, 0.083 and 0.067, respectively.
22 p-Values for the seven columns of Table 3 are 0.008, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000 and 0.000, respectively.
22 R. Croson et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 114 (2015) 13–26Fig. 3. Average contributions in BSM in percentage of endowment across treatments.
We  see a signiﬁcant declining pattern of contributions (Table B.1.1) and a signiﬁcant restart effect (p = 0.0637, N = 12,
Wilcoxon signed rank test) in the baseline BSM. However, we see no decline and no restart effect in the BSM-EX treat-
ment (p = 0.3173, N = 6, Wilcoxon signed rank test). The average contribution in the baseline BSM decreases in all teams to
approximately 25% of the endowment. However, efﬁciency does not increase over rounds in the BSM game (see Table B1.2
in the online supplement). In the BSM-EX, full contribution is reached in 98% of all outcomes, consistent with the theoretical
predictions. The addition of redistribution has only a small (but negative) quantitative and non-robust additional impact on
contributions, although the difference is signiﬁcant over the entire game (p = 0.002).23 Contributions in the BSM-RE average
94% of endowment, and the negative restart effect is marginally signiﬁcant (p = 0.0874, N = 6, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
Result 3a. Excludability boosts contributions to full levels, consistent with predictions. The addition of redistribution,
however, has a small negative quantitative effect.
Finally, excludability signiﬁcantly increases efﬁciency (p = 0.018). However, including redistribution leads to a signiﬁ-
cantly lower efﬁciency level, worse even than the level of efﬁciency in the baseline (p = 0.012 versus excludability only,
p = 0.000 versus baseline). Team production is signiﬁcantly increased with excludability (p = 0.001), but then remains high
as redistribution is added (p = 0.699 versus excludability and p = 0.001 versus baseline).
Result 3b. Excludability increases efﬁciency and team production in the BSM. When redistribution is added, team produc-
tion remains high while efﬁciency levels decrease.
In the BSM-RE, the efﬁcient allocation requires coordination on an asymmetric contribution proﬁle with voluntary self-
exclusion. Such a proﬁle can lead to a fair sharing of efﬁciency gains only if subjects rotate their positions. Players have to
efﬁciently alternate between full contribution and zero contribution. Tacit coordination on an efﬁcient rotation of positions
between rounds is extremely difﬁcult. The signiﬁcantly lower contributions (see Figs. 3 and C3.3) in the BSM-RE treatment
relative to BSM-EX indicate that subjects attempt to increase group efﬁciency, but the reported efﬁciency levels also indicate
that coordination on more efﬁcient outcomes than equilibrium outcomes largely fails.
4.4. Summary
We  have compared contribution levels to team production in three team production functions with excludability and
with redistribution. We  ﬁnd that excludability has a massive impact on contributions in the VCM and the BSM settings –
with an overall contribution level of at least 90% – and that this effect is compatible with our theoretical considerations. We
did not, however, anticipate the strong effect of redistribution observed in the WLM  production function.
In the VCM, excludability increases efﬁciency, and adding redistribution enhances the result. In the WLM,  excludability has
no effect on efﬁciency, but the addition of redistribution improves matters signiﬁcantly. In the BSM, excludability increases
efﬁciency, but adding redistribution has a negative effect rather than a positive one.
Thus, our data indicate that efﬁciency hinges on the production function in question. In the VCM setting, excludability with
redistribution achieves the highest efﬁciency level (99% efﬁciency). In the weakest link production function, excludability
23 p-Values for two-tailed Mann–Whitney tests comparing BSM and BSM-EX-R are 0.084, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000, and 0.000 for the seven columns
of  Table 3, respectively. Similar comparisons between the BSM-EX and the BSM-RE treatments are signiﬁcant in some cases, being 0.020, 1.00, 0.310, 1.00,
0.026,  0.026, and 0.002, respectively.
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ith redistribution also performs best (72%). In the best-shot setting, however, excludability leads to the highest efﬁciency
evels (86%) with no added redistribution.
Finally, for the principal, excludability can increase team production in VCM and BSM situations, while redistribution is
ecessary for increased team production in WLM  situations.
. Behavioral explanation
This paper analyzes the effect of excludability and redistribution on team production for a number of team functions.
he theoretical predictions made by our models (RDE and QRE) are that we  should expect a massive impact of excludability
n the VCM and BSM but no large impact in the WLM.  Additionally, redistribution is not predicted to have any impact at
ll.24 Our experimental results demonstrate that these predictions are basically right for the VCM and BSM,25 but they are,
n particular, in view of the QRE, not so successful for the WLM.26 In this section, we want to understand which key feature
n the production functions causes excludability and redistribution to have a differential impact.
Fig. 4 displays the evolution of the provision of the team project in the WLM  under excludability and under redistribution
n the ﬁrst block of ten rounds. In round 1, average contributions in the WLM-EX (26.67) and WLM-RE (31.17) are not
igniﬁcantly different27 (p-value: 0.2224, Mann–Whitney test at the group level). However, in round 2, the trajectories
iverge (16.33 and 47.33, respectively, p-value: 0.0025), and after that round, the difference remains constant primarily
ecause no trend in either treatment is observed (we  have included two dashed lines at the provision levels in round 2 for
he two treatments as a visual reference). Without redistribution, groups are trapped in inefﬁcient levels of team output
rom round 2 on.
Fig. 4 suggests that there is a major change from the ﬁrst to the second round that is strongly mediated by redistribution.
o gain an understanding of why this happens, we  analyze the impact of excludability in round 1. How do excluded and
on-excluded subjects react to exclusion? Our answer is that they do so very differently in different conditions. Excluded
articipants signiﬁcantly increase their contributions in round 2 with or without redistribution; on average, they go from
3.33 to 38.17 (p-value = 0.0277) in the excludability condition and from 15.58 to 29.62 (p-value = 0.0166) with redistribution.
on-excluded participants continue with similar average contributions in the redistribution condition (31.19 in round
 and 31.21 in round 2, p-value = 0.7238), whereas average contribution levels signiﬁcantly decline from 37.17 to 27.11
p-value = 0.0464) in the excludability treatment in absence of redistribution.In the WLM,  the team output is determined by the minimum contribution in the group, not by the average contribution
Croson et al., 2005). Hence, we must analyze the individual adjustments of contributions to exclusion. Fig. 5 analyzes
ecisions made by those participants not excluded in the ﬁrst round, across both the VCM and the WLM,  and with and
24 Redistribution is not predicted to have an effect on contributions because in the VCM and BSM, exclusion is already predicted to boost full contribution
and  therefore, there is no room for further improvement once redistribution is allowed), while in the WLM,  zero contribution is predicted in excludability
nd  redistribution treatments.
25 Point predictions are slightly disappointing, though, when the comparison is made for the overall behavior – especially for the baseline treatments.
owever, they capture quite nicely long-term behavior (round 20).
26 The RDE predicts zero and full contribution for the WLM-EX. The contributions in the WLM-EX basically move to the extremes in the restart game. The
rajectories of the four groups approach zero and of two groups approach full contribution (see Appendix C).
27 All non-parametric tests employed in this section are performed at the group level.
24 R. Croson et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 114 (2015) 13–26
Fig. 5. Non-excluded participants’ reaction to ﬁrst round decisions.Fig. 6. Distribution of earnings of non-excluded team members in rounds 1 and 2.
without redistribution. More precisely, it plots the intensity of their reaction measured by the lowest contributor in the
second round, in other words, decisions by non-excluded participants (in the ﬁrst round) who contributed less in the second
round. Fig. 5 strongly suggests that the drop in contributions is large and signiﬁcant only in the WLM  without redistribution.
While the most extreme reaction is moderate in the VCM-EX, VCM-RE and WLM-RE (a mere 5.6%, 6.2% and 2.2%, respectively),
contribution decreases by 74% in the WLM-EX and team output collapses (p-value: 0.0273; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, N = 6).
The extreme reaction by the non-excluded participants in the second round of the original game of the WLM-EX is at
odds with the fact that the theoretical prediction is identical to the VCM-EX, where excludability is very successful. As in
the original WLM,  all symmetric contribution proﬁles are NE of the game. Relative to the VCM-EX, where all contributions
contribute to the team output, in the WLM-EX, low contributions drain all team beneﬁts. Relative to the WLM-RE, where top
contributors obtain an additional share of the team output (coming from excluded participants, if non-negative), there is no
bonus waiting for top contributors in the WLM-EX. Fig. 6 presents the effect of this difference, presenting the distribution
of earnings of non-excluded subjects in rounds 1 and 2 (across the VCM and the WLM,  with or without redistribution).28
Top performers in round 1 are safely above the secure payoff associated with keeping the endowment for private con-
sumption in all games, with the exception of the WLM-EX where more than three-fourths of non-excluded subjects make
less than 50. Losses associated with large contributions prevent coordination on highly ranked equilibria, and contributions
collapse in the WLM-EX.
28 Fig. 6 is a standard box and whisker graph. The box contains the 25–75% quartiles, the bar corresponds to the median, and whiskers include the adjacent
values in each condition. Hollow diamonds are outliers.
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. Conclusions
We  examine the effects of excludability in three different production functions (the voluntary contribution mechanism
VCM] where the average contribution determines production, the weakest link mechanism [WLM]  where the minimum
ontribution determines production and the best-shot mechanism [BSM] where the maximum contribution determines
roduction). Our results indicate that excludability with and without redistribution has an important effect on contributions.
xcludability without redistribution is sufﬁcient to raise contributions in the VCM and BSM production functions to near-total
ontribution levels; adding redistribution in these settings has little impact (and in the case of the BSM, a negative impact).
n contrast, in the WLM,  excludability by itself has only a small impact on contributions, but redistribution is also necessary
o increase contributions. Increasing contributions does not necessarily lead to increased efﬁciency in these mechanisms,
owever. While adding excludability increases efﬁciency in the VCM and the BSM, redistribution is necessary for increased
fﬁciency in the WLM  and redistribution hurts efﬁciency in the BSM.
The comparative static results for the VCM and BSM production functions are mostly consistent with the Nash, risk-
ominant and quantal-response equilibrium predictions in our settings, although they are unable to explain the role played
y redistribution in the WLM.  The general picture is that excludability successfully boosts contribution levels because the
eaction to exclusion is an increase in the contribution levels, to avoid future exclusion, and the reaction of non-excluded
embers is to continue contributing at the same levels. This general picture has one exception: the WLM  mechanism. In
his mechanism, low contributions determine the team output and therefore hurt high contributors more than in the VCM
nd BSM. In fact, we observe that high contributors dramatically decrease contributions in round 2, trapping teams in a low
erformance equilibrium from which they never recover. Redistribution makes a big difference in the WLM  because it gives
op contributors an additional beneﬁt: the group shares of those excluded.29 This relatively small incentive is necessary for
xcludability to impact contributions in the weakest link mechanism, where strong complementarities between workers
xist. In that sense, this paper documents how differences in production technologies, even when they do not generate
hanges in the theoretical analysis, may  generate very different behavioral reactions.
Our policy message has to do with the positive effects of this mechanism and its limits. The possibility of exclusion from
 team’s beneﬁts appears to us as a natural incentive device to sustain contribution. Many norms in ﬁrms, organizations
nd societies involve excludability, although its concrete realization may differ between settings. Our results predict that
he incentive systems based on excludability will elicit high effort levels from the best-performing members, as well as
rom those individuals who want to be included in production functions in which there are no complementarities in the
embers’ contributions. In case of complementary contributions, excludability needs to be coupled with redistribution to
chieve large efﬁciency gains.
Like all research, this study has important limitations. For example, our results are found in symmetric settings; we
nduce the same opportunities and payoff functions for each participant. If contributors instead face different endowments
r have different payoffs, excludability may  be less effective. As with any incentive scheme, there can also be disadvantages
o excludability. In general, incentive schemes are sensitive to collusion and to sabotage (see Harbring and Irlenbusch,
011; Carpenter et al., 2010, for example); one might imagine similar problems with excludability (as has been suggested
n the case of the implementation of the stack rank mechanism in Microsoft). In addition, excludability requires at least
ome monitoring (in our design, only ordinal information is required, but other exclusion schemes may  require cardinal
easurements of contribution) and may  be difﬁcult to implement. However, we  believe that excludability can (and does)
rovide an effective, low-cost way to induce cooperation, increase efﬁciency and support team production in social dilemmas
nd related situations.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.
015.03.005.
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